Given the inequity and irrationality apparent in the allocation of police personnel, the Khayelitsha Commission recommended that this method be urgently revised. This article reviews the evidence heard on the allocations and the method currently used to allocate police personnel, suggests an alternative method, and calls on the government to heed the recommendation of the Khayelitsha Commission that the state urgently revise its method of allocation of policing resources.
Khayelitsha receive approximately one-third of the average per capita allocation. The issue of allocation by the state of human resources to policing is one that impinges on various constitutional rights, such as the right to safety and security of the person, dignity, life, and equality before the law, together with the right not to be unfairly discriminated against. Where the distribution of human resources in policing per capita is not only unequal from area to area, but areas comprising predominantly poor and black people are particularly under-resourced, indirect discrimination on protected constitutional grounds exists. Such unequal resourcing is automatically unfair unless the state can show that the allocations are fair.
At the commission, one of the authors gave evidence that reviewed the relative resourcing of police stations in the Western Cape as well as the method employed by the SAPS to determine relative resourcing. A rational method for determining relative resourcing was also proposed. This article recalls the evidence presented, with an adjusted proposed formula, and also analyses the evidence provided by various SAPS members pertinent to the allocation of resources.
We conclude that an urgent review of the allocations is required. Khayelitsha has grown into a set of neighbourhoods with a population of about 400 000 people, approximately one-half of whom live in formal houses and one-half in shacks, mostly in informal settlements rather than backyards. 7 The average yearly income of households in Khayelitsha is estimated at R20 000, compared to the Cape Town average of R40 000, with expert evidence suggesting that between 32%
and 46% of all households in Khayelitsha are living in 'severe poverty'. 8 Crime and violence is endemic to the area; murder and contact crime such as assault, aggravated robbery and rape are rife. 9 The commission heard a range of evidence on the breakdown in relationships, and found that members of the community have indeed lost faith in the police's ability to protect them. 10 Figure 1 compares residents' rating of the difficulty accessing police in various areas, with Khayelitsha and Harare scoring the worst of the areas surveyed. The commission heard evidence that a lack of human resources was at least partly to blame for inadequate service delivery by the police. Indeed, senior SAPS members testified before the commission that there are not enough operational police persons to provide an efficient and effective service in Khayelitsha.
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The commission wished to understand the extent to which this insufficiency occurred throughout the SAPS, or whether it was specific to the Khayelitsha areas. The actual allocation of operational human resources to the three Khayelitsha stations as well as all the other police stations in the Western
Cape was therefore obtained from the SAPS by the commission. 12 The commission requested one of the authors to analyse the figures. The numbers were simply compared to the respective populations of these policing areas to determine differences in allocation per capita (per 100 000 people), using population data from Census 2011 (see Table 1 ). 'Difficult or very difficult to access police' % How the SAPS determines the allocation of resources 
Flaws in the SAPS method
Apart from the problem of budget constraints resulting in the THRR's being unachievable, the SAPS THRR itself has a number of flaws. Some of these will be considered here, to demonstrate how an apparently rigorous method can result in absurdity.
The factors in the Input Management Sheet used to inform the THRR purport to relate to the burden of policing in one of the following ways:
• They affect the burden in terms of difficulty and extent of policing (e.g. number of square kilometres, presence of schools, daily influx of commuters, number of gangs), including the actual incidence of crime
• They affect the burden of police interaction with the courts and with prisons (e.g. proximity of courts and prisons)
• They affect the burden of internal police Harare would be allocated'. 22 Nel appears not to have been aware that however hard he tried, no more than a 5% weighting would apply.
The above briefly alludes to a few of the ways in which the THRR goes astray. Ultimately, however, the best test of the SAPS's method is common sense.
Does the method accurately and fairly distribute resources on the basis of burden of policing?
The reality is that the allocations results in township One reported crime indicator that is not susceptible to reporting trends is murder. This is particularly robust; checked against morgue data it does not appear to be suffering significant under-reporting: over five years the total variance is 1.7% for the Khayelitsha 'drainage area' (comprising all three policing areas).
In areas where there are high reporting rates, murder tends to track serious violent crimes such as aggravated robbery, and can be considered to be a proxy for such crimes. 24 In the absence of any other indicator, the incidence of more people allocated to sector teams in Khayelitsha at the expense perhaps of fewer people for 'general enquires'.
Consequently, in relation to visible policing, it is recommended that the total population (the per capita measure) should remain the primary indicator of relative resourcing. This is particularly important as visible policing is the largest component of the SAPS.
There is an argument that this is too conservative and that in fact the incidence of violent crime should be the primary determinant of visible policing. The counter-argument is that much violent crime, in contrast with property crime, takes place in private spaces, which are not affected by visible policing.
The primary indicator of the administrative burden should thus be the population of the area served;
alternatively, the total size of the policing allocation already made.
Proposed method for national figures
What does this method imply in practice regarding operational personnel is calculated using the ratios obtained from the annual reports.
As described above, the primary determinant of visible policing and administrative function resources should be population size. Thus, the available administrative and visible policing personnel must be divided equally among the population. To do this the total number of relevant personnel in South Africa is divided by the total population of South Africa, and multiplied by 100 000, to arrive at the number per 100 000.
On current personnel and population figures as indicated in Table 3 Table 4 overleaf.)
Adjustments to the primary distribution allocations Wherever the minimum number for the station type concerned is higher than the number suggested by the primary distribution formula as initially applied, the minimum number becomes the number allocated to that area. Whenever that substitution occurs, each such difference between the allocated number and the minimum number must be subtracted from the total number to be used in an amended formula. The primary distribution formula is then applied to the stations that have not had the minimum allocated, using the reduced totals. From the total available personnel, 60 are removed from the total. For the formula calculations, the respective populations, crime numbers and murder numbers emanating from the already allocated areas must be subtracted from those totals in order to calculate the factors that must be applied to the remaining 144 stations.
Conclusion
In our view the pattern of unequal allocation of police resources between wealthy and poor suburbs in the Western Cape has not been adequately justified for rationality and fairness by the SAPS, and thus violates the equality clause (section 9) of the Constitution. 25 In addition, whatever method used to allocate human resources must be open and transparent, and subject to public comment and scrutiny. 
